AI-powered and AI-automated attacks
- Attackers are expected to use AI (and “agentic AI” / autonomous agents) to automate reconnaissance, exploit search, phishing, intrusion, lateral movement and even breach orchestration at machine speed.
- Use cases include deepfake-based social engineering, automated spear-phishing, prompt-injection attacks (for systems embedding generative-AI), and autonomous malware with adaptive behavior.
- That lowers the bar for attackers — small groups or lone actors with AI tools may achieve what previously needed bigger teams or nation-state resources.
- Implication: Defenders can no longer rely solely on “slow” manual triage or signature-based defenses — detection, mitigation and containment need to operate at high automation and speed.
Supply-chain and software-dependency compromise “as default risk”
- Attacks targeting software supply chains — e.g., open-source libraries, dependencies, cloud-hosted platforms — are expected to grow significantly. A compromise at a small or upstream vendor may cascade to hundreds or thousands of downstream organizations.
- This includes both “traditional” software supply chains and cloud-native ecosystems, container registries, infrastructure-as-code templates, third-party services, etc.
- Implication: Even well-defended orgs are vulnerable if they depend on unverified third-party code. Software supply-chain hygiene and continuous vetting become critical.
Escalating risk to critical infrastructure, OT/ICS, and hybrid environments
- According to recent forecasts, 2026 will likely see intensified attacks on industrial control systems (ICS), operational technology (OT) environments, and hybrid systems combining IT + OT.
- Critical infrastructure (energy, utilities, manufacturing, transport) remains a top target — the potential impact (service disruption, safety risks, reputational damage) is large.
- Implication: Organizations operating or supporting critical infrastructure need to assume “compromise will happen” and adopt robust segmentation, monitoring, and incident response strategies.
Identity, credentials, and non-human identity (NHI) abuse
- As per recent intelligence, attackers increasingly target service accounts, API keys, credentials, OAuth tokens, cloud identities, machine/service-to-service identities — not just human user accounts.
- The rise of remote/cloud-native architectures and automated services means identity-centric attacks (misuse of credentials, token theft, identity impersonation) will be especially potent.
- Implication: Zero-trust identity management, least-privilege access, credential rotation, audit and anomaly detection must become the baseline — identity is the new perimeter.
Continued and more sophisticated ransomware / extortion + snapshot-style attacks
- Ransomware remains a top threat: with AI-enabled malware and faster propagation, we may see larger, more destructive attacks — often targeting supply chains or critical infrastructure.
- Attackers are likely to adopt more subtle, “stealth-first, extortion-later” methods: exfiltrate data, hold it for ransom (or sell), rather than just encrypt.
- Implication: Backups, immutable storage, anomaly detection, segmentation and ransomware-resistant architecture remain essential — but now under pressure from faster, AI-enhanced threats.
AI-targeting — weak link: polluted or misused AI systems
- As more organizations adopt AI-based tools for productivity, automation, or decision making, compromising those AI agents or injecting malicious prompts becomes an attractive route for attackers.
- Risks include: unauthorized data extraction, malicious command execution, bypassing of traditional security checks, or serving as “inside agents” inside corporate infrastructure.
- Implication: Security must extend into AI/ML pipelines, with strict access controls, prompt validation, logging, and limits on what AI-powered agents can execute — treat them as high-privilege “users.”
Strategic Advice for 2026
- Treat AI-driven attacks as business as usual: invest in automation for defense, detection at machine speed, and threat hunting.
- Insist on supply-chain hygiene: vet dependencies, isolate third-party code, prefer signed/trusted libraries.
- Protect identities first — human and non-human. Implement least-privilege, zero-trust, credential hygiene, audit logging.
- Harden infrastructure & OT/ICS: segmentation, network monitoring, regular pentests of hybrid environments (IT + OT).
- Assume ransomware/extortion is inevitable — design for resilience: immutable backups, isolation, incident-response drills.
- Treat AI agents as privileged entities: secure, log and limit what they can do; review permissions frequently.